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COMMENT BY JUDGE ON FAILURE

OF ACCUSED TO GIVE NoTIcE OF
ALIBI DEFENSE.-[England] When
formally charged in the police court
of carnal knowledge of a girl between the ages of sixteen and thirteen defendant had said, "I am not
guilty. I reserve my defense." At
the trial he raised the defense of
alibi. The trial judge commented
tc. the jury on the fact that the defendant's silence had deprived the
prosecution of an opportunity to
make adequate inquiry into the
truth of the defense. The verdict
was "guilty." Defendant was convicted. Held: on appeal affirmed.
The comment did not .constitute a
misdirection. The silence of the
accused, while not evidence against
him, could be considered in reference to the weight of the alibi defense: Rex v. Littleboy [1934] 2
K. B. 408, 151 L. T. 412.
It seems well established that a
mere failure on the part of a defendant to raise his alibi defense
when formally charged before a
magistrate cannot be considered as
substantive evidence corroborating
the testimony of the prosecution's
witnesses: Re.x v. Tate [1908] 2 K.
B. 683, 99 L. T. 620; Rex v. Whitehead [1929] 1 K. B. 99. However
authorities are divided as to whether
a comment by the judge on defendant's failure is unduly prejudicial.
The holding in the instant case that

it is not is well supported by precedent: Rex v. McNair [1909] 2 C.
A. R. 2; Rex v. Moran [1909] 3 C.
A. R. 25; Rex v. Parker [1933] 1
K. B. 850; Rex v. Humphries [1903]
67 J. P. 396. In Rex v. McNair,
supra, the court succinctly said, "If
a prisoner is ill-advised enough to
say at the' police court that he will
reserve his defense, thereby making
it impossible for his story to be investigated before the trial, it is no
ground on which we can interfere
with the verdict. For an innocent
man the sooner his defense is raised
the better."
On the other hand
Rex v. Naylor [1933] 1 K. B. 685,
23 C. A. R. 177, is a strong authority holding that such a comment by
the trial judge is unfair and constitutes reversible error. It is there
pointed out that the Criminal Justice Act (1925) §12-2 prescribes
that a prisoner before the magistrate
shall be cautioned in these words,
"Do you wish to say anything in
answer to the charge? You are not
obliged to say anything unless you
desire to do so, but whatever you
say may be taken down in writing
and may be given in evidence upon
your trial." Also the fact is emphasized that a defendant at such
times usually acts on advice of counsel. The court says, "It would be
strange if a point could properly
be made against a prisoner because,
acting on the advice of a solicitor
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and following the very words of an
Act of Parliament, he says that he
does not desire to say anything at
that stage." Accord: Rex v. Tate,
supra; Rex v. Whitehead, supra.
But see Note (1932) 6 Aust. L. J.
175 criticizing Rex v. Naylor, supra,
on the ground that since the object
of a trial is to ascertain the truth,
and since every care is taken to give
the accused full information as to
the evidence upon which the prosecution will rely, it is only fair and
proper that he make a seasonable
disclosure of the nature of his
defense.
While the precise problem presented by the instant case has not
been discussed in American decisions, the weight of authority in this
country seems to be that, since alibi
is a perfectly legitimate defense,
and the only one which may be open
to an innocent person accused of
crime, any instruction which tends
to belittle or disparage this defense
is erroneous and constitutes prejudicial error: Albin v. State (1878)
63 Ind. 598; Sheehan v. People
(1889) 131 IIl. 22, 22 N. E. 818;
Henry v. State (1897) 51 Neb. 149,
70 N. W. 924; State v. Crowell
(1899) 149 Mo. 391, 505 S. W. 893;
State v. Donelly (1921) 116 S. C.
113, 107 S. E. 149, 14 A. L. R. 1420
(judge told jury that alibi was a
rogue's defense); People v. Barr
(1922) 55 Cal. App. 321, 203 Pac.
828; State v. Molay (1932) 174 La.
63, 139 So. 759; People v. Russell
(1935) 266 N. Y. 147, 194 N. E.
65; People v. Robbins (1935) 275
N. Y. S. 940, 242 App. Div. 516.
Some courts, however, hold that
where a defendant relies on an alibi,
a cautionary instruction to the effect that the defense is easily manufactured and that proof thereof
should be scanned with care is
proper: People v.Tice (1897) 115

Mich. 219, 73 N. W. 108; People v.
Wudarski (1931) 253 Mich. 83, 234
N. W. 157; People v. Marcus (1931)
253 Mich. 410, 235 N. W. 402; Shea
v. U. S. (1918) 251 Fed. 433; State
v. Leet (1919) 187 Iowa 385, 174
N. W. 253; Stata v. Cartwright
(1919) 188 Iowa 579, 174 N. W.
586; State v. Wrenn (1922) 194
Iowa 552, 188 N. W. 697; People v.
Sharp (1922) 58 Cal. 637, 209 Pac.
266. Such instructions are more apt
to meet with approval if the jury
is also told that the defense of alibi
is legitimate and entitled to full
weight: People v. Carson (1920)
49 Cal. App. 12, 192 Pac. 318; State
v. Banoch (1922) 193 Iowa 851, 186
N. W. 436.
The tendency of the courts to
view the defense of alibi with suspicion has its root in the fact that
this defense lends itself more easily
than others to fabricated and perjured evidence, and in the fact that
by concealing his intention until the
time of trial the accused may deprive the state of an opportunity to
adequately investigate the truth or
falsity of the testimony offered and
the credibility of the witnesses. If
the ability of the accused to take
advantage of the prosecution by unfair surprise were removed, much
of the popularity of the alibi defense
would be obviated, for the state
would have a chance to expose false
evidence. The Scottish law has a
remedy for this evil. It provides
that alibi, insanity and certain other
defenses cannot be raised unless
tendered to the court at the first
diet, or at the latest two days before
the trial, as a plea of special defense: Renton and Brown, "Criminal Procedure According to the
Law of Scotland" (2nd ed. 1928)
p. 68. While many of the United
States have laws requiring a notice
of insanity defense, Dean, "Advance
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Specifications of Defense in Criminal Cases" (1934) 20 A. B. A. J.
435, 437, only two at the present
time have laws requiring alibi notice. Michigan and Ohio adopted
such laws in 1929: Mich Comp.
Laws (1929) §§17313, 17314; Ohio
Code Ann.- (Throckmorton 1934)
§13444-20. The Ohio statute is as
follows: "Whenever a defendant in
a criminal cause shall propose to
offer in his defense, testimony to
establish an alibi in his behalf, such
defendant shall, not less than three
days before trial of such cause, file
and serve upon the prosecuting attorney, a notice in writing of his intention to claim such alibi; which
notice shall include specific information as to the place at which the
accused claims to have been at the
time of the alleged offense; in the
event of failure of a defendant to
file the written notice in this section
prescribed the court may, in its discretion, exclude evidence offered by
the defendant for the purpose of
proving such alibi." There has been
considerable agitation for such a
law in New York although none
has yet been passed: See Millar,
"The Statutory Notice of Alibi"
(1934) 24 J.Crim. Law 849. "The
Draft Code of Criminal Law and
Procedure" proposed by the Cbmmittee on Revision of the Illinois
State Bar Association in co-operation with the Judicial Advisory
Council of Cook County contained
such a provision: Draft Code 408.
The need for such legislation and
the value of that already enacted
has been emphasized by the authorities: Millar, op. cit. supra; Millar,
"The Modernization of Criminal
Procedure" (1920) 11 J.Crim. Law
344; Dean, op. cit. supra, p. 436;
Burdick, "Criminal justice in America" (1925) 11 A. B. A. J.510, 512.
In State v. Thayer (1931) 124 Ohio

S: 1, 176 N. E. 656, the trial court
refused to admit alibi evidence because the defendant had not given
the statutory :notice. The appellate
court in affirming asserted the desirability of the law and upheld its
constitutionality. Accord: State v.
Nooks (1930) 123 Ohio, S. 190,
174 N. E. 743. See also Woodruff
v. State (1930) 360 Ohio App. 287,
173 N. E. 206 (where notice is given
evidence of alibi should be admitted) ; McGoon v. State (1931)
390 Ohio App. 212, 177 N. E. 238;
People v. Miller (1930) 250 Mich.
721, 229 N. W. 475 (state waived
failure to give notice by not objecting to alibi testimony at the
trial); People v. Wudarski, supra.
In both Michigan and Ohio these
laws have proved a definite aid in
the administration of justice. After
the law was passed in Ohio, "The
number of alibi defenses was reduced to a minimum and in a very
short time the popularity of this
mode of defense waned. Criminals
as well as their lawyers seemed impressed with the fact that an alibi
defense refuted in open couft is
worse than no defense at all. Moreover, the provision (requiring notice) ... robbed this mode of defense
of its most valuable quality, i. e.,
the surprise element": Esch, "Ohio's
New Alibi Defense Law" (1931) 9
Panel 42. Similarly in Michigan
the percentage of convictions in
cases where alibis were offered increased. The opportunity for inquiry afforded police officials resulted not only in the refutation of
false alibis but also in a number of
perjury convictions of alibi witnesses: Toy, "Michigan Law on
Alibi and Insanity Reduces Perjury" (1931) 9 Panel 52.
The fact that such legislation was
in force would afford a strong additional argument to those courts
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which hold it erroneous for the trial
judge to instruct the jury that the
alibi defense, as one especially difficult to disprove, should be carefully scrutinized.
The Michigan
court, however, since the passage of
the law has held that such an instruction is still proper in that state:
People v. Wudarski, supra; People
v. Marcus, supra. It certainly would
dispense with the necessity for any
comment, like that in the instant
case, on the fact that defendant unfairly surprised the prosecution by
remaining silent as to his defense
until the day of trial.
C. I. WALDO, JR.
WITHDRAWAL OF PLEA OF GUILTY.

-[California]
Defendant, an illiterate Mexican unable to speak
English, pleaded guilty to a charge
of murder and was sentenced to
death. He then applied for a writ
of error coram nobis and moved to
vacate the judgment and sentence,
expressing a desire to change his
plea, and asserting that he had been
induced to enter it on the assurance
of his counsel that the district attorney had discussed the case with
the trial judge and that a life sentence would be imposed should he
plead guilty, while hanging would
be asked if he did not. The state
not being represented at the hearing
below, no contradictory evidence
was presented, but the application
was denied. Held: on appeal, reversed. The asserted unfair treatment of defendant not being denied,
he should be allowed to withdraw
his plea: People v. Campos (Cal.
1935) 43 Pac. (2d) 274.
Motions looking to the withdrawal
of a plea of guilty are addressed to
the discretion of the trial court, usually subject to review on appeal if
denied: Fogus v. United States (C.

C. A., 4th, 1929) 34 F. (2d) 97;
People v. Lavendowski (1927) 326
Ill. 173, 157 N. E. 193; Cassidy v.
State (1929) 201 Ind. 311, 168 N.
E. 18, 66 A. L. R. 622; State v.
Hare (1932) 331 Mo. 707, 56 S. W.
(2d) 141. Contra, as to any right
to appeal: Billingsley v. United
States (C. C. A., 9th, 1918) 249
Fed. 331; Clark v. State (1896) 58
N. J. L. 383, 34 Atl. 3. The conditions under which a change of plea
should be permitted vary widely,
but the principal case presents the
typical combination of an ignorant
defendant, official pressure, and a
severe sentence, which probably
warranted the granting of the appeal. Wherever the plea of guilty
is made by a defendant who is ignorant of its effect or of the extent
of punishment which might be imposed, withdrawal should be allowed. Frequently when this rule
is involved he is a foreigner, a
negro, or a stranger under such
handicaps as inexperience, illiteracy
or feeblemindedness:
People v.
Lavendowski, supra; Harris v.
State (1932) 203 Ind. 505, 181 N.
E. 33; East v. State (1929) 89 Ind.
App. 701, 168 N. E. 28; Cassidy v.
State, supra; Corlise v. State (1928)
94 Fla. 1192, 115 So. 528. When
the prisoner was not told before his
plea that he could have counsel, and
was repeatedly denied communication with attorneys thereafter, the
appellate court may properly reverse
the judgment: People v. Pisoni
(1926) 233 Mich. 462, 206 N. W.
986. And appointment by the court
of an inexperienced or indifferent
attorney may not remedy the failure
of the judge to inform the defendant of his rights: State v. Poglianich (1927) 43 Ida. 409, 252 Pac.
177; Rhodes v. State (1927) 199
Ind. 183, 156 N. E. 389. Extreme
haste in proceedings by which a
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young negro was sentenced to the
penitentiary within four hours after
the offense, without any advice as
to his right to counsel, has also
been held sufficient grounds for
withdrawal: Tipton v. State (1925)
30 Okla. Crim. Rep. 56, 235 Pac.
259. On the other hand, if the defendant was fully informed of his
rights the fact that he had no attorney does not in itself warrant a
withdrawal: People v. Wheeler
(1932) 349 Il1. 230, 181 N. E. 623;
and an affidavit that the court had
not advised him of his rights has
been held insufficient when it did
not specifically allege his ignorance:
Farnsley v. State (1925) 196 Ind.
722; 149 N. E. 436. Should it feel
that justice has been done the appellate court can hold that the bare
recital in the record that the defendant was fully advised by the
trial judge is sufficient: People v.
Walker (1911) 250 Ill. 427, 95 N.
E. 475; but this is rightly a form
which a court mist sometimes feel
free to ignQre.
However well the defendant may
understand the sie-nificarnce of a plea
of guilty it ought not to be final
when popular prejudice or threats
of mob violence would make the
alternative of jury trial a fruitless
one: Sanders v. State (1882) 85
Ind. 318; Little v. Commonwealth
(1911) 142 Ky. 92, 133 S. W. 1149;
State v. Poglianich, supra; State v.
Harvey (1924) 128 S. C. 447, 123
S. E. 201. Threats by prosecutors
of additional charges or trouble may
add reasons for permitting withdrawal: Fromcke v. State (1927)
37 Okla. Crim. Rep. 421, 258 Pac.
927; State v. Harris,supra.
As in the principal case, the contention is often made that the plea
was secured by a promise of leniency. The form of this promise
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might establish a prosecutor's agreement, and be binding in some states
even without the approval of the
judge: People v. Bogolowski (1925)
317 Ill. 460, 148 N. E. 260; same
case, 326 Ill. 253, 157 N. E. 181;
and see Note (1933) 24 J. C. L.
600. A promise merely to recommend a lighter sentence to the judge
can be overcome by the use of a
legal presumption that defendant
knew that the judge was not bound
to follow any recommendation:
Cainarota v. United States (C. C.
A., 3rd, 1924) 2 F. (2d) 650; State
v. Lewis (1924) 113 Ore. 359, 230
Pac. 543; Mahoney v. State (1925)
197 Ind. 335, 149 N. E. 444; People
v. Ensor (1925) 319 Ill. 255, 149 N.
E. 737. Cf. People v. Clavey (1934)
355 Ill. 358, 189 N. E. 364. The
evidence presented in all sich cases
is usually in great conflict, the extent of the inducement may vary
widely, and the confusion of the
precedents and formulas gives the
greatest possible leeway to the
courts. It would seem ctesirable, ordinarily, to ignore statements by
policemen and jailers: but see as
exceptions People v. Byron (1915)
267 Il. 498, 108 N. E. 685 (arresting officer told boy he would get
probation, but the judge said nothing about it while explaining his
rights to him); Cassidy v. State,
supra (feebleminded boy advised to
plead guilty, by his employer and
one of the arresting officers, but no
specific promises made). At the
other extreme should fall the principal case, with both the prosecutor
and judge said to have agreed on
a lighter sentence to the knowledge
of the defendant, and withdrawal
should be allowed when the bargain
is not kept: Morgan v. State (1926)
33 Okla. Crim. Rep. 277, 243 Pac.
993; State v. Kring (1880) 71 Mo.
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551. The intervening possibilities
must of necessity be left to the discretion of the courts.
Withdrawal of the plea of guilty
will seldom be allowed in order to
permit the defendant to raise a
purely technical defense: Carr v.
State (1924) 194 Ind. 162, 142 N.
E. 378 (illegal search); People v.
Chesnas (1927) 325 IIl. 361, 156 N.
E. 372 (confession possibly inadmissible) ; Bartcgek v. State (1925) 186
Wis. 644, 203 N. W. 374 (illegal arrest) ; People v. Murphy (1923) 62
Cal. App. 709, 217 Pac. 810 (appellant admits the same crime against
one not named in the indictment);
Mack v. State (1932) 203 Ind. 355,
180 N. E. 279, 83 A. L. R. 1349
(attempt to change "not guilty" to
plea in abatement on alleged prejudice of one grand juror). This result is a logical one, since appellant's
guilt is no longer the principal issue, although it may suggest that
the prisoner was not fully informed
at the time of his plea as to just
how strong a defense could be made
in his behalf. Since an indictment
which does not charge a crime cannot be the basis of a conviction
under any plea, withdrawal should
be allowed in such qases as a formality aiding, in the subsequent
treatment of the case: State v.
Hare, supra; People v. Rosenkrantz
(1924) 123 Misc. 335, 205 N. Y. S.
861; and when all his alleged coconspirators were acquitted, a defendant is entitled to withdraw his
plea: Rex v. Plummer [1902] 2 K.
B. 339, 4 B. R. C. 917. Cf. United
States v. Lieberman (D. C. N. Y.,
1925) 8 F. (2d) 318 (withdrawal
denied where indictment mentioned
"other persons unknown").
The
failure of the appellant to contend
that he is in fact innocent of the
crime charged is frequently given
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as one reason for denying his request: State v. Finney (1934) 139
Kan. 578, 32 Pac. (2d) 517; Capps
v. State (1928) 200 Ind. 4, 161 N.
E. 6; and the general allegation that
he has a "good defense" may not
take its place, being a "mere conclusion" of the pleader: State v.
Peterson (1926) 42 Ida. 785, 248
Pac. 12 However, no such claim of
innocense is made in the principal
case.
The mere fact that the defendant
expected a lighter sentence, though
often urged, is said to-be no ground
for withdrawal: People v. Blrnzen
(1927) 87 Cal. App. 236, 261 Pac.
1103; Mfastronada v. State (1882)
60 Miss. 86; even though the punishment be death: People v. Chesnas, supra;People v. Dabner (1908)
153 Cal. 398, 95 Pac. 880. It is inevitable, however, that the severity
of the sentence, the nature of the
act done, the previous record of the
defendant, and the treatment accorded his probable confederates
should all influence the decision:
cf. Baker, "Reversible Error in
Homicide Cases" (1932) 23 J. C.
L. 28. For example, on the unchallenged facts in both People v.
Chesnas and People v. Dabner,
supra, the murders were of the most
brutal sort, while Chesnas had an
extensive, though minor, criminal
record. A few cases may typify
the other side of the judicial process: State v. Harris,supra; Harris
v. State, supra; People v. Rucker
(1931) 254 Mich. 342, 236 N. W.
801; State v. Harvey, supra; People
v. Schwarz (1927) 201 Cal. 309, 257
Pac. 71. In four of these appeals
guilt was not denied; with one exception, each apparently knew what
he was doing when he pleaded
guilty; and only one could show any
sort of agreement with the prosecu-
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tion. In each case leave to change
the plea was given, and the real
grounds of injustice appear to be
the heavy sentences imposed. In
one the punishment was 250 years
for five petty holdups, in another
life for a $2 robbery, in another all
the defendant's companions had
been acquitted, and in the other two
their confederates had paid small
fines while appellants were sentenced to the penitentiary; only in
the first-mentioned case did the defendant have any previous record.
Cf. also State v. Manager (1922)
149 La. 1083, 90 So. 412.
So long as a criminal trial remains the capricious thing that it
is, a defendant loses a potential
advantage in waiving it, and if he
has money or influence, it may be
assumed that he rarely Will.
Whether the courts ought to return
that advantage to those who do admit a crime, for less than the strongest of reasons, must remain a matter for argument; and with the
different combinations of ignorance
and trickery which the cases may
produce it becomes impossible to
generalize. The trial court, having
the facts before it, is obviously in
the best position to judge; yet the
gross abuses of that discretion
which some of the appeals expose
demonstrate the justice of permitting an occasional withdrawal.
GolwoN W. WINKs.

REVOCATION

OF

PAROLE -

TImE ALLowANcE.-[Federal]

GoOD

Pe-

titioner was sentenced to serve a
term of eighteen months' imprisonment in a federal reformatory. He
was paroled after serving about
seven and one-half months of his
term. If the petitioner had not been
paroled and his conduct in prison

had been satisfactory, he would
have been entitled to a good behavior allowance which would have
reduced his term of imprisonment
to about fourteen and one-half
18 U. S. C. A. §710.
months:
Shortly after his release on parole
petitioner violated his parole. The
violation was not discovered until
after the minimum sentence with
good time allowance bad expired,
but before the expiration of his
maximum sentence. As soon as it
was discovered, the United States
Board of Parole issued a warrant
for petitioner's arrest, the intent
being to revoke the parole and remand the petitioner to prison. He
was arrested within a few days and
applied for his release under writ
of Jmbeas corpus, claiming that the
Board of Parole had no authority
to have him arrested after the expiration of his minimum term of
sentence. The District Court directed that he be retained in custody
under the warrant of arrest. Held:
on appeal, affirmed. Parole board
was authorized to revoke parole of
one violating parole, notwithstanding that period of minimum sentence
with good conduct allowance had
expired, where term of imprisonment as fixed by sentence had not
expired: United States v. Anderson (C. C. A. 8th, 1935) 76 F. (2d)
375.
The problem involved in this case
is one of statutory construction. It
is to decide whether or not the petitioner's term automatically ended
while he was out on parole on the
date of the expiration of his minimum term of sentence, giving him
time allowance for good behavior,
which would have been mandatory
had he been confined in the reformatory during his entire sentence: (1909) 28 Op. Atty. Gen. 109.
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In the absefnce of the good behavior
statute, the normal result would be
for the period of parole of a prisoner to last at least as long as the
total original term of sentence, and
there would be no question but that
the prisoner could be returned to
prison to complete the serving of
his sentence if the parole was revoked seasonably: Ex parte Taylor
(1932) 216 Cal. 113, 13 Pac. (2d)
906; People v. Hill (1932) 348 Ill.
441, 181 N. E. 295; People v. Barr
(1932) 257 N. Y. S. 395. The rule
is even more strict in some jurisdictions, for it has been held that
parole is a status that continues with
the prisoner even after the expiration of his original term of sentence, and its breach at any time
will subject him to rearrest: Fuller
v. State (1898) 122 Ala. 32, 26 S.
146; Comm. v. Minor (1922) 195
Ky. 103, 241 S. W. 856; State v.
Yates (1922) 183 N. C. 753, 111
S. E. 337; Ex parte Ridley (1910)
3 Ok. Cr. 350, 106 Pac. 549. This
severe view was justified in the
Minor case, supra, on the grounds
that the punishment provided by
law could be inflicted only in prison,
and until it was completed any release from prison on parole could
be on the condition that a breach of
parole would subject the offender to
a return to prison to complete the
sentence. Similarly, in the Yates
case, supra, it was said that the essential part of the sentence for the
violation of the criminal law is the
punishment, not the time that punishment shall begin and end. A similarly strict view is that the parolee
is subject to re-arrest for a breach
of parole at any time until he is
actually discharged from parole:
In re Millert (1923) 114 Kan. 745,
220 Pac. 509. A very sensible decision is that of Kirkpatrick v. Hol-
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lowell (1924) 197 Ia. 927, 196 N.
W. 98 where it was held that if
a violation of parole occurred before the expiration of the term of
sentence, the parole could be revoked after the date on which the
term would normally end where
such revocation was seasonably had.
There are some cases holding that
parole cannot be revoked after the
expiratiofn of the term of sentence:
Crooks v. Sanders (1922) 123 S. C.
28, 115 S. E. 760; Anderson v.
Wirkman (1923) 67 Mont. 176, 215
Pac. 224. The explanation offered
in the Crooks case, supra, is that
parole should be liberally construed
in favor of the prisoner. Despite
the difference in the severity of
their rules, all these cases sustain
the view that parole is not an absolute pardon, and in accepting it
the prisoner is subject to return to
prison for breach of parole during
the period he is deemed to be on
parole.
The principal case is not as simple
as this, for the federal statute under which the petitioner was paroled
provides that such paroled person
while on parole, shall remain "under
,the control of the warden of such
prison from which paroled, . .
until the expiration of the term or
terms specified in his sentence, less
such good time allowance as is
provided by law": 18 U. S. C. A.
§716. By its terms this statute
limits the period of the warden's
dominion oven the parolee to the
time of his minimum term, and the
petitioner contends that under this
statute he became a free man upon
the expiration of his minimum term.
However, it should be noted that
this section of the statute does not
deal with the question of the revocation of parole, but merely with the
period during which he shall be in
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the custody of the warden. Thsection of the statute dealing with
violation of parole provides that if
the warden or the parole board has
reliable information that the prisoner has violated his parole, "then
said warden, at any time within the
term or terms of the prisoner's sentence, may issue his warrant . . .
for the retaking of such prisoner":
18 U. S. C. A. §717. The court
reasons that the difference in wording between these two sections of
the statute must be deemed intentional, and that for this reason the
revocation of parole was seasonable,
and the prisoner was lawfully arrested. As further evidence of the
intent of the legislature to have parole continue until the expiration of
the full sentence, if there has been
a breach prior to the minimum
period of sentence, the court suggests the absurdities that might result from charging the warden with
immediate knowledge of any acts
of breach by the parolee, at the risk
of allowing the parolee to become
a free man by not acting on such
constructive knowledge- before the
expiration of the minimum sentence. It would be requiring the
warden to regulate the conduct of a
man whom he actually could not
control because of his physical,
absence.
The court here decided, through
the process of statutory construction, that a federal prisoner who has
been paroled will be deemed on parole and subject to return to prison
for a breach of parole at any time
within the term of imprisonment,
as fixed by the sentence. Although
the decision is unquestionably sound,
it would have been possible to rest
it on positive authority rather than
mere statutory construction. It has
been held that when a paroled con-
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vict breaches his parole, his status
immediately becomes that of an escaped prisoner, and he becomes a
fugitive from justice: Platek v.
Aderhold (C. C. A. 5th, 1934) 73
F. (2d) 173; Biddle v. Asher (C.
C. A. 8th, 1924) 295 F. 670; Ex
parte Daniels (Cal. App., 1930) 294
Pac. 735. In the Platek case, supra,
the paroled convict committed another crime and was sent to prison
elsewhere for a term of sufficient
duration that when he was released,
his parole would have been ended
if time were the only consideration.
The court said that the breach acted
to suspend the running of sentence
until such time as he could be returned, his status becoming that of
an escaped convict. Another authority to the same effect is Anderson v. Corall (1923) 263 U. S. 193,
44 S. C. 43, where it was said that
"mere lapse of time, without imprisonment, is not service of sentence . . . (and) if a federal convict breaks parole and is retaken
under a warden's warrant, the
Board of Parole may revoke the
parole any time prior to full service
of sentence and require its coipletion without time off for good behavior." In the case of Moore v.
White (C. C. A. 8th, 1927) 23 F.
(2d) 467, it was intimated that for
parole to be revoked, the paroled
prisoner must first be re-arrested under a warden's warrant. Assuming
this to be true, the Moore case,
supra, is controlled by the Supreme
Court case of Anderson v. Corall,
supra, and since the warden's warrant was issued before the expiration of the sentence, it is valid, and
the arrest legal. It is clear that,
although the court avoided giving a
direct answer to petitioner's claim
that his parole ended by the passage
of the date of his minimum term,
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the Platek and Biddle cases, supra,
afford ample authority for saying
that where he has previously
breached his parole he does not automatically become a free man with
the passage of his minimum term,
but is rather a fugitive from justice.
The source of difficulty in the principal case is the fact that under the
federal statutes there are two ways,
aside from an absolute pardon from
the executive, in which a prisoner
may obtain his release from prison
at a date earlier than the expiration
date of his sentence. If the prisoner's conduct in prison is satisfactory, it is mandatory that he be
credited with a good time allowance, and that he be freed from
prison on the expiration of such
minimum sentence: 28 Op. Atty.
Gen. 109. On the other hand, parole
is entirely discretionary with the
Parole Board: Redman v. Duehay
(C. C. A. 9th, 1917) 246 F. 283. As
already indicated, the statutes regulating parole, if construed technically, might support the claim of
the petitioner that he automatically
became a free man upon the expiration of his minimum sentence.
For this reason, it would seem preferable to rest the decision on the
grounds that the petitioner was lawfully arrested as a fugitive from
justice.
It is interesting to note that the
federal statutes regulating parole
have been modified, subsequent to
the sentence of the petitioner in the
principal case, in such a way that
as to any prisoner sentenced after
the effective date of the modifications, if he is paroled, he "shall continue on parole until the expiration
of the maximum term or terms specified in his sentence without deduction of such allowance for good conduct as is . . . proviled for by

law": 18 U. S. C. A. §716a. If this
statute had been in effect defendant's claim for release would have
been clearly without foundation.
E. V. MOORE.
RAPE-CORROBORATION

OF PROSE-

Defendant was
convicted on a charge of statutory
rape of a twelve year old girl and
sentenced to the penitentiary. The
testimony of the prosecutrix was
uncorroborated and was squarely
contradicted by the defendant. Held:
on appeal, reversed. Where a conviction in a rape case depends on
the testimony of the prosecuting
witness and the defendant denies
the charge, the evidence of the
prosecuting witness should be corroborated by other testimonial or
circumstantial evidence: People v.
Nelson (Ill. 1935) 196 N. E. 726.
Scarcely a week before the decision of the Nelson case, the court
finally disposed of the case of People v. Polak (Ill. 1935) 196 N. E.
513. Two defendants had been convicted of the rape of Sylvia
Drank; both denied categorically
her charges, though intercourse was
admitted. A physician who examined the prosecutrix immediately
after the commission of the alleged
crime found internal injuries tending to substantiate her claim. In
its opinion affirming the conviction,
the court said, "If the testimony of
the prosecutrix is clear and convincing, it is not necessary that she
be corroborated in order to sustain
a conviction."
At common law corroborationL of
the testimony of the prosecutrix
was unnecessary to sustain a conviction of rape.
Nevertheless,
many states, for the purpose of protecting against false accusations,
have passed statutes requiring corCUTRIX.-[Illinois]
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roboration. In absence of statute
the rule is generally in accordance
with common law: Wigmore, "Evidence" (2d ed. 1923) §2061; Wharton, "Criminal Law" (12th ed. 1932
§724. Illinois has no statute, and
the common law rule enunciated in
the Polak case, supra, viz., that the
uncorroborated testimony of the
prosecutrix is sufficient if clear and
convincing, was also laid down in
People v. Sciales (1931) 345 Ill.
118, 117 N. E. 689. In other cases
no rule of thumb was laid down although generally where there was
a reversal the testimony of the
prosecuting witness was weak and
there was little or no corroborating
evidence: People v. Nemes (1932)
347 Ill. 268, 179 N. E. 868; Peoplv. Damneron (1932) 346 Ill. 408, 179
N. E. 95. Where the conviction
was affirmed, as in the Sciales case.
supra, the prosecutrix told a very
credible story or was corroborated.
The inconsistency between the
rules of law laid down in the Nelson and Polak cases, the one requiring, the other dispensing with
corroboration, becomes. explicable
after an inspection of the facts involved. In the Nelson case the
court reviewed the fantastic tale of
.a witness who failed entirely to inspire credence; the conviction was
reversed. In the Polak case the
circumstances (such as the doctor's
examination) seemed to bear out
the story of the prosecutrix and
otherwise comported with human
experience; therefore, the conviction was sustained. In each of these
cases the appellate court obviously
weighs the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses as a second
jury, and does not wish to be
hampered by any iron clad rule of
law. The court, in such cases, considers questions of both law and

fact as on an appeal, disregarding
the nature of the writ of error before it which, strictly speaking
should allow an inspection of errors
of law only. While it is perhaps
inevitable that the appellate court
should re-try the case, such contradictory language as appears in the
Nelson and Polak cases is certainly
undesirable.
A rule should be
adopted which allows flexibility of
judgment and at the same time uniformity and consistency of decisions.
As was pointed out in People v.
Sciales, supra, "in nearly every
case of this nature the amount of
direct testimony is bound to be
meager in so far as proof of the
charge is concerned and equally so
in matters of defense." A statute
or rule of law requiring corroboration in every case would be unnecessarily binding on the court. Where
a straightforward and consistent
story has been told by a credible
complaining witness the court should
be free to affirm a finding of guilty
although there is no supporting evi:
dence: See Wigmore, loc. cit. supra.
The rule stated in the Polak case
and People v. Sciales permits the
court to affirm or reverse as the
circumstances require and is in accord with the common law. Employment of this rule in the instant
case would not have necessitated a
different result. A reversal could
have been based on the ground that
the testimony of the prosecutrix was
neither convincing nor supported by
other evidence. It is submitted that
the court, in laying down the inflexible rule that a prosecutrix must
be corroborated if a conviction for
rape is to be affirmed, not only set
an undesirable precedent but als(
created an unnecessary inconsistency among its decisions.
ROBmREN. BURCHMORE.

